Intertemporal choice and psychophysics of time-perception have been attracting attention in econophysics and neuroeconomics. Several models have been proposed for intertemporal choice; exponential discounting, general hyperbolic discounting (exponential discounting with logarithmic time-perception of Weber-Fechner law, a q-exponential discount model based on Tsallis' statistics), simple hyperbolic discounting, and Stevens' power law-exponential discounting (exponential discounting with Stevens' power time-perception).
Introduction
Studies in psychopharmacology, neuroscience, and behavioral economics have revealed that humans and non-human animals prefer sooner smaller rewards to larger later ones ("delay discounting", [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ). Substance misuse and addiction are associated with impulsivity in intertemporal choice (a large time-discount rate) [1-5, 9-12, 15-17] .
Furthermore, recent psychophysical studies suggested that addicts and impulsive psychiatric patients such as ADHDs (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder patients) and orbitofrontal lesion patients have impaired time-perception, which may result in difficulty in patience/self-control in intertemporal choice [2, 3, [15] [16] [17] 21] . Impulsivity in intertemporal choice is defined as strong preference for small immediate rewards over large delayed ones. For instance, subject A who prefers "one apple available one year later" to "two apples available one year and a week later" is more impulsive than subject B who prefers "two apples available one year and a week later" to "one apple available one year later" (most people may behave as the subject B, in this example). In classical economic theory, it has been assumed that subjects have consistent intertemporal choice behavior (a constant temporal discounting rate), based on the assumption of human rationality and/or preference for simplicity of economic theory [6] . However, recent behavioral and neuroeconomic evidence indicates that human and animal discounting rates are changeable, more specifically, decreasing towards the future (decreasing impatience), resulting in preference reversal over time [1, 4, 6] . Suppose the above example again. If the same subject B prefers "one apple available today" to "two apples available one week later" (again, most people may make decisions in this way), her intertemporal choice is inconsistent, in that delays from the sooner rewards to later ones are the same (i.e., a week) in the two 4 intertemporal choice problems. As shown in the examples, if subjects prefer larger later rewards in intertemporal choice in the distant future, but prefer smaller sooner rewards in intertemporal choice in the near future, their intertemproal choices are "dynamically inconsistent" (in economics' sense), because their preferences reverse as time passes. On the contrary, if someone prefers smaller sooner rewards in both examples; i.e. "one apple available one year later" and "one apple available today", her intertemporal choice is impulsive but dynamically consistent ("rational" in economics' sense), because preference does not reverse over time.
Several studies have reported that neuropsychiatric and neurological patients (such as addicts, psychostimulant abusers, orbitofrontal brain lesion patients, and sleep-deprived subjects as well) are associated with impaired time-perception [2, 3, [14] [15] [16] [17] [21] [22] . In other words, "short temporal horizon" (future myopia) due to overestimation of delay lengths in intertemporal choice may partly account for the augmented discounting in the neuropsychiatric patients. No study to date, however, has examined psychophysical effects of time-perception on intertemporal choice in a quantitatively rigorous and systematic manner. A recent neuroimaging study [20] demonstrated that time-perception in intertemporal choice is represented in dopaminergic neural circuits (e.g., the caudate nucleus) which are known to be modified in drug-dependent patients [23] . Therefore, it is important to examine the fitness of intertemporal choice models which incorporate psychophysical effects on time-perception into time-discounting behavior, to human behavioral data, for a better understanding of neuropsychopharmacological and biophysical basis of impulsive behavior. In the present study, we examined the fitness of several types of intertemporal choice models with different types of psychophysical effects on time-perception, i.e., no psychophysical effects (i.e., exponential discounting and simple 5 hyperbolic discounting), the Weber-Fechner law (general hyperbolic discounting), and Stevens' power law. Furthermore, biophysical simulation studies in nonlinear physics indicate that psychophysical laws of sensation (e.g., Stevens' power law and Weber-Fechner law, introduced later) are due to non-synaptic electrical coupling between sensory signal-processing neurons [25] .
Exponential discounting
Consistent temporal discounting (simple exponential discounting), which is typically assumed in neoclassical economic theory including theory of rational addiction, follows the exponential equation [4, 6, 15] :
where V is the subjective value of a reward, A is the (objective) amount of the reward, and D is the objective (physical) time-duration of delay until the delivery of reward. The free parameter k is an index of the degree to which a subject discounts the delayed reward, i.e.,
larger k values correspond to more rapid delay discounting. In simple exponential discounting, there is no inconsistency in intertemporal choice, because a discount rate := -(dV(D)/dD)/V =k is independent of D (a time-constant discount rate).
Exponential discounting with Weber-Fechner time-perception
As noted, recent studies reported that individual/group differences in temporal discounting are strongly related to those in time-perception [14, 22] . Based on these findings, it has been proposed that combining psychophysical effects on time-perception such as Weber-Fechner law (i.e. logarithmic time-perception) with the exponential discounting may be capable of describing empirically observed intertemporal choice behavior such as decreasing impatience and preference reversal [15, 17] . Because in logarithmic time-perception, 6 subjective time-duration τ (psychological time) is expressed as:
exponential discounting with the subjective delay τ (exponential discounting with logarithmic time-perception) is formulated as:
where A is the objective amount of the reward, D is an objective/physical delay length and b and g=ka are free parameters. It should be noted that Equation 3 is the same as a general hyperbolic discount function, proposed in behavioral psychology [8] , by combining psychological effects on time-perception and a (more conventional) simple hyperbolic discount function introduced below. In the general hyperbolic discount model, a discount Tsallis' non-extensive thermostatistics in econophysics [18, 19, 24] . More specifically, the q-exponential discount model is
where q and k q indicate time-consistency (a time-independent discount rate) and impulsivity at delay D=0 (= −(dV(D)/dD)/V| D=0 ), respectively [18, 19, 24] . Note also that, as one can see from Equation 3, by utilizing relationships q=(g-1)/g and k q =bg, we obtain parameters in the q-exponential discount model from those in the Weber-Fechner discounting.
Simple hyperbolic discounting
Most studies in behavioral neuroeconomics and psychopharmacology [5, 11] have been 
where k s is a simple hyperbolic discount rate, A is the objective amount of the reward, and D is an objective delay length until receipt. In the simple hyperbolic discounting, a discount
, which is also a decreasing function of delay (decreasing impatience) when k s >0 (i.e. "positive time preference" in economics' sense), resulting in preference reversal over time. It is to be noted that the simple hyperbolic discount function has been introduced from the optimal foraging theory (or the application of the Holling's optimal patch use theory) with a handling time parameter but without psychophysical effects on time-perception, in behavioral ecology [7, 8] .
Exponential discounting with Stevens' power time-perception
Behavioral economists Daniel Read and colleagues reported that patience in intertemporal choice decreases (i.e., a discount rate increases) when the time-interval of the delay until receipt is divided into shorter time-blocks, [13] . In order to explain the subadditivity in temporal discounting exponential discounting with time-perception following Stevens'
power law has been proposed [16] . Subjective time-perception (τ s ) following Stevens'
power law (named after the psychophysicist Stevens) is: 
Method

Participants
Twenty-six (12 male and 14 female) volunteer students from a major national university in Japan participated in the experiment. The average age was 22.07 (standard deviation= 2.3) years. They were recruited from several psychology classes. They participated in a intertemporal choice task, for their parameters of intertemporal choice models to be estimated.
Procedure
We utilized exactly the same experimental procedure as Bickel et al [5] and Ohmura et al's [12] in the intertemporal choice task. Firstly, participants were seated individually in a quiet room, and face the experimenter across a table. After that, participants received the simple instruction that the monetary reward in this experiment was hypothetical, but the experimenter wanted you to think as though it were real money. Then the participants were asked to choose between the card describing money delivered certainly and the card describing money delivered with a certain delay of receipt. The left card viewed from participants indicated the amounts of money that could be received immediately (a smaller 10 but immediate reward), and the right card indicated 100,000 yen that could be received with a certain delay (a larger but delayed reward).
For the intertemporal choice task, monetary rewards and the delay were printed on 3×5 index cards. The 27 monetary reward amounts were 100,000 yen (about $1,000), 99,000 yen, 96,000 yen, 92,000 yen, 85,000 yen, 80,000 yen, 75,000 yen, 70,000 yen, 65,000 yen, 60,000 yen, 55,000 yen, 50,000 yen, 45,000 yen, 40,000 yen, 35,000 yen, 30,000 yen, 25,000 yen, 20,000 yen, 15,000 yen, 10,000 yen, 8,000 yen, 6,000 yen, 4,000 yen, 2,000 yen, 1,000 yen, 500 yen, and 100 yen. The seven delays of receipt were 1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5 years, and 25 years. The experimenter turned the 27 immediate cards sequentially. The card started with 100,000 yen, down to 100 yen, and back to 100,000 yen. For each card, the participant pointed either the immediate or delayed reward. The experimenter wrote down the last immediate reward chosen in the descending order, and the first immediate reward chosen in the ascending order, and the average of them was used as the point of subjective equality (hereafter indifference point) in the following analysis. This procedure was repeated at each of the seven delays (for more details, see [12] ).
Data analysis
The analytical strategy of statistical procedures in the present study was exactly the same as in a previous study on probabilistic choice models [28] . We employed discounting and psychophysical parameters introduced in the discounting equations above. Bonferoni's correction was utilized).
Results
Intertemporal choice models at group level
First, we estimated the parameters in the four types of intertemporal choice models by fitting the four types of equations to group median data of the indifference points at the delays (see Fig.1 ). After fitting each model to the group median data, we calculated AIC c with best-fit parameters as an index of fitness (see Table 1 for estimated parameters and 
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Intertemporal choice models at individual level
Next, we examined the goodness-of-fit of the intertemporal choice models for individual data by computing AIC c s of the intertemporal choice models for each subject's data ( Table 2 This again implies that the temporal discounting models with non-linear psychophysical effects on time-perception (i.e. exponential discounting with Weber-Fechner type time-perception or with Stevens' power law-type time-perception) better fit the behavioral data than temporal discounting models without the psychophysical effects (i.e., simple hyperbolic and exponential discounting functions). Additionally, it is suggested that time-perception in intertemporal choice follows the Weber-Fechner law (logarithmic time-perception), rather than Stevens' power law. It should again be noted that the smaller 14 AIC c s in psychophysical time-discounting models were not due to the larger numbers of free parameters in the intertemporal choice models incorporating psychophysical effects (see 2.
3).
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Discussion
To our knowledge, this study is the first to systematically examine the fitness of intertemporal choice models, in terms of psychophysical laws of time-perception (including Stevens' power law), by employing AIC c as an indicator of the fitness. A main finding of the present study is that temporal discounting models with non-linear temporal cognition due to psychophysical effects significantly better fit the behavioral data, in comparison to discounting models without psychophysical effects. thermostatistics [18, 19, 24] . It is suggested that (i) human intertemporal choice is under strong influences of psychophysics of time-perception, in line with recent findings in psychopharmacological and neurological studies on impulsivity [2, 3, 21, 22] , and (ii) human 15 temporal cognition in intertemporal choice (over one week-25 years) may follow the Weber-Fechner law (i.e. logarithmic time-perception), rather than Stevens' power law.
Intertemporal choice and psychophysics of time
Because (i) drug-dependents and psychostimulant users have impaired time-perception and exaggerated impulsivity in temporal discounting [2, 3, 21, 22] , (ii) the psychophysical laws may be attributable to electrical coupling via gap junctions [25] and a chronic administration of addictive induces overexpression of gap junction proteins (e.g. connexin 32/36) in dopaminergic neural circuits [29] , and (iii) a recent neuroimaging study reported human time-perception in intertemporal choice is represented in dopaminergic brain regions [22] , it should be examined how dopaminergic drugs change electrical coupling associated with psychophysical effects on temporal cognition, in order to explore neuropsychopharmacological treatment for addiction and impulsivity/inconsistency in intertemporal choice.
Relation to biophysics of psychophysical laws
Non-linear biophysical simulation studies have examined the neural dynamics underlying psychophysical laws such as Weber-Fechner law and Stevens' power law [25, 30, 31] . It should be noted that the experimentally fitted value of the Stevens' exponent in the present study is close to the theoretical value (~0.4) of Copelli and colleagues' simulation study [25] . Furthermore, a biophysically plausible Stevens-type relationship (i.e., the Hill equation) has numerically similar characteristics to the Weber-Fechner law [25, 30, 31] . Consistent with this speculation, when the delay is short (within a year), the fitted curves of the Stevens' power discount model and the Weber-Fechner discount model were similar (see Fig. 1 ). Moreover, the mentioned biophysical simulation studies [25, 30, 31] demonstrated that the Stevens' exponent may be a critical exponent in a non-equilibrium phase transition of the neural system. Therefore, it is possible that the 16 collective status of time-processing neurons differ between addicts' and healthy controls' brains, because addicts have altered temporal cognition [21, 22] . Tellingly, Becker and
Murphy's economic theory of rational addiction [32] and subsequent mathematical analysis of the rational addiction model [33] predict that subjective values of delayed rewards and drug intake behavior by rational addicts may be chaotic and bi-stable. How the behavioral characteristics of rational addiction are related to non-linear biophysical characteristics of neural systems is an important question for future studies.
Limitations and future directions
We now discuss limitations of the present study. Because the present study was conducted in healthy control subjects, it is not completely incontestable that our present findings can be generalized for dopaminergic drug-dependent patients and substance misusers. However, because substance misusers also discount delayed rewards in a time-inconsistent manner, which is associated with their loss of self-control [1, 4, 5, 11] , it is possible for our present findings to be generalized, to some extent, for drug-dependent individuals. Future studies should extend the present findings into clinical populations such as psychostimulant abusers and dopaminergic drug-dependent patients.
Conclusions
Our present study demonstrated that (i) intertemporal choice behavior is better Table 2 Parameters and AIC c s of intertemporal choice models for individual data For individual data (N=26), the order of goodness-of-fit was [Weber-Fechner discounting 
